Abstract-The future smart grid will enable homes to have energy storage units that can store the excess power generated from renewable energy sources and sell it to the grid during the peak hours. Realization of this process, however, requires the utility company to be able to communicate with the storage units whenever needed. Nonetheless, the security and the privacy of this communication is essential to not only ensure a fair energy selling market but also eliminate any privacy concerns of the users due to potential exposure of their energy levels. In this paper, we propose a secure and privacy-preserving power injection querying scheme by exploiting the already available advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and long-term evolution (LTE) cellular networks. The idea is based on collecting power injection bids from storage units and sending their aggregated value to the utility rather than the individual bids in order to preserve user privacy. We also develop a bilinear pairing-based technique to enable the utility company to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the aggregated bid without accessing the individual bids. In this way, no party will have access to the storage units' individual bids and use them to achieve unfair financial gains. We implemented the proposed scheme in an integrated AMI/LTE network using the ns-3 network simulator. Our evaluations have demonstrated that the proposed scheme is secure and can protect user privacy with acceptable communication and computation overhead.
Privacy-Preserving Power Injection Over a Hybrid AMI/LTE Smart Grid Network I. INTRODUCTION
O NE OF the main objectives of the smart grid is the reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the dependency on fossil fuels [1] . This can be done by facilitating the large-scale deployment of renewable energy generators, such as photovoltaic or wind power generators, and promoting full (or hybrid) plug-in electric vehicles (PHEVs) [2] . This suggests that the smart grid will have a large number of storage units that can store the excess power at the period of strong sun or wind and inject power to the grid during periods of reduced production to balance demand and supply [2] . The storage unit owners and the utility company will mutually benefit from this process. Utilities can meet the peak hour demand, thereby, flattening the daily load curve and reducing the investment in power generation, whereas the storage unit owners can make revenue by participating effectively.
In order to achieve such an outcome, the utility companies should have the ability to communicate with the storage unit owners. We propose exploiting the already existing network infrastructures specifically advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) will be used to connect storage units to the network of smart meters (SMs). AMI networks are currently being implemented to provide two-way communications between the SMs and the utility companies via certain gateways [3] . From the gateway to the utilities, the connection is provided by using WAN alternatives. We propose using long-term evolution (LTE) cellular networks that are characterized by reliability, high availability, and large coverage area. However, since transactions will be involved, the security of this communication is essential to ensure a fair energy selling market. Certain security features should be supported on this network. Furthermore, the communications with the storage units can reveal sensitive information about the owners. For instance, if the occupants of a house do not spend much time at home, e.g., because they are traveling, the house's battery injects more power than the usual amount. The leaked information can also be used for monetary gains as the utility company wants to buy power with low price and the storage units want to maximize their revenues. For example, if some storage units know that the other units do not inject power (or inject little power), they can monopolize the market and deny selling power to force the utility to offer high prices. Finally, since the LTE networks are owned and operated by private companies, the LTE operator may examine the communication packets to obtain sensitive information.
In this paper, we tackle the above problems and propose a secure and privacy-preserving querying scheme for the utilities which uses cryptography constructs and data aggregation techniques to hide the sensitive information. The approach works as follows: when the utility company needs to buy power, it sends the proposed purchase price to the storage units. Each storage unit prepares its bid which should indicate the amount of power it can inject with the announced price. The storage units' bids are aggregated and sent to the utility by gateways via LTE networks. In this way, the individual bids are not exposed to the utility company. It can only know the total amount of power that can be injected from a number of storage units. However, the utility can still verify the authenticity and integrity of the aggregated bids by employing a bilinear pairing-based message authentication code without accessing the individual bids. For the payment, the storage units are not paid after every transaction, but a meter connected to the storage units can measure the amount of power injected by the unit every month. Then, it sends one monthly payment message to the utility. We implemented the proposed scheme using ns-3 simulator on an integrated AMI/LTE network where the AMI uses IEEE 802.11s-based wireless mesh. Our evaluations have demonstrated that the proposed scheme can achieve the privacy requirements with almost negligible performance degradation. We have also analyzed the security features of the proposed scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the network and threat models. The proposed scheme is presented in Section III. We analyze the security and privacy preservation of the proposed scheme in Section IV. Then, we evaluate the communication and computation overhead and present NS3 simulation results in Section V. The related works are summarized in Section VI. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. NETWORK AND THREAT MODELS

A. Network Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the considered network model has a number of communities and a utility company that are connected through LTE network. Each community has energy storage units within a certain neighborhood that are connected to AMI. Each AMI network connects to a base station [evolved node B (eNB)] and eventually to the utility company through LTE network. In the following, we give more details.
1) AMI Network:
The AMI network consists of a group of SMs and a gateway. The SMs send fine-grained power consumption data to the utility, e.g., every few minutes. As shown in Fig. 1 , our scheme can be used in two different topologies of the AMI networks: 1) single hop and 2) multihop. In multihop (or mesh) AMI networks, the SMs are connected via multihop wireless mesh topology. Each SM should act as a router to relay other meters' packets. In single-hop AMI networks, each SM sends its data directly to the gateway. The network routes are created using the IEEE 802.11s mesh standard [4] . The gateway can receive data from the utility and broadcast it to the SMs in the AMI network. It can also collect power injection related data from the SMs and send it to the utility.
2) Energy Storage Units:
The storage units can be PHEVs or home batteries. They may store energy from renewable energy sources or from the grid. Power can be bought from the grid at low-price periods and injected to the grid at high prices. The decision of buying or selling energy is made individually by each storage unit. Each storage unit can communicates to an SM using IEEE 802.11s protocol.
3) Utility Company: The utility company cannot communicate with the storage units directly, rather this has to be via the AMI and LTE networks. If the demand is more than the supply, it should contact electricity vendors (including storage units) to buy power.
4) LTE Network:
The LTE network has two main parts: 1) the core network and 2) the radio access network. The core network has a set of switches, servers, and other devices with mostly wired communications. The radio access network is the wireless part that connects the gateways and utility to the base stations (eNB).
B. Adversary and Threat Model
The utility company is honest-but-curious. It does not aim to disrupt the communications or manipulate the data, but it is curious to know private information about the owners of energy storage units and also any information that can help achieve financial gains. The LTE network is also curious to know the amount and time of the power injection of each storage unit. Each storage unit is interested to know the other units' bids to decide whether it is more profitable to sell power now. The AMI network and external attackers are also curious to know sensitive information. The utility company does not collude with the storage units because they have conflicting interests. The utility wants to buy energy with cheap prices but the storage units want to increase revenues. The utility company and the LTE operator do not collude because they are owned by different authorities.
In addition to the privacy threats, our scheme is protected against known security threats. In impersonation attacks, the attackers may attempt to impersonate the LTE, storage units, or the utility, to send data under their names. Other attackers may try to alter or fabricate the bids of the storage units, e.g., to achieve financial gains. Each storage unit decides independently the amount of power it can inject so that it can maximize its revenue. The storage units are rational in the sense that they inject the amount of power committed in their bids because this is more profitable.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME When a utility company needs to buy power from a community, it sends power purchase request packet (Power_Req) to the community's gateway that broadcasts the request to the storage units in its community. After receiving this packet, each storage unit sends its bid in power purchase reply packet (Power_Rep) to the gateway. The bid has the amount of power the unit can inject with the announced price in the Power_Req packet. The gateway then sends an aggregated bid to the utility. Fig. 2 summarizes the whole process of packet exchanges among different parties.
A. Bootstrapping
The utility should bootstrap the system to setup some parameters and keys. It creates a finite field Z * q , an additive group G a , and a multiplicative group G m , where the order of Z * q , G a , and G m is a large prime number q. Q is the generator of the G a .ê is a bilinear pairing function that maps elements in G a to elements in G m , where ∀ P 1 and P 2 ∈ G a ,ê(P 1 , P 2 ) → G m . See [5] for more details about the bilinear pairing properties. Let h 1 () and h 2 () be two one-way hash functions, where h 1 : {0, 1} * → G a and h 2 : {0, 1} * → Z * q . The utility company chooses a random element sk u ∈ Z * q and computes PK u = sk u Q, where sk u and PK u are the private and public keys, respectively. Each gateway chooses a random element sk g ∈ Z * q and computes PK g = sk g Q, where sk g and PK g are the private and public keys.
Then, the gateway submits PK g to the utility to issue a certificate to bind the public key to the gateway's identity. Similarly, each storage unit with identity id i chooses a random element sk i ∈ Z * q and computes PK i = sk i Q, where sk i and PK i are the private and public keys, respectively. It also obtains a certificate for PK i from the utility. The new storage units that join the system should contact the utility to receive the necessary credentials.
We also use the Paillier [6] homomorphic cryptosystem to add the bids in a privacy-preserving manner. Homomorphic encryption is a special form of encryption in which multiplying a set of encrypted numbers produces the encrypted sum of these numbers. We refer to [7] for more information about homomorphic encryption. The utility generates homomorphic encryption public key pair ( f , g) and the corresponding private key (λ). It keeps sk u and λ secret and publishes the public parameters { f and g,
B. Power Purchase Request
To start the process of purchasing power from a community, the utility company should send power purchase request (Power_Req) packet to the community's gateway. As shown in Fig. 2 , the packet has the identities of the utility company and gateway, id u and id g , respectively. It also has the list of power purchase prices per unit in each time slot {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k }, where k is the number of time slots. The utility selects a random element r u ∈ Z * q and attaches r u Q to the packet. r u Q is used to establish one-time keys shared with the storage units. It also attaches a timestamp (TS) and a signature (σ u ), where,
After receiving the packet, the gateway first verifies the freshness of the packet by making sure that the difference between the current time and the TS is short. Then, it verifies the signature by checking thatê(σ u , Q)
The proof of this verification is as follows:
Finally, the gateway broadcasts the power purchase request to the SMs in its community to send to the storage units.
C. Bids Preparation and Transmission
Each storage unit should prepare a bid for the amount of power it can inject in each time slot. The format of the bid of the storage unit ID i is expressed as b i = {b
is a group of bits that gives the number of power units the storage unit can inject in time slot t x . The storage units should send back power request reply packet (Power_Rep). The packet has its identity (id i ), the identities of the gateway and utility, r i Q, TS, σ i , masked bid (B i ) and
The storage unit chooses a random element r i ∈ Z * q and computes r i Q. Each storage unit should calculate a shared key with the utility as follows k i = h 2 (ê(PK u , sk i r i r u Q)). This key is used to mask the storage unit's bids and enable the utility company to ensure the aggregated bid's integrity and authenticity without accessing the individual bids.
Like our work in [8] , we will compare two different aggregation schemes using point addition and homomorphic encryption. In case of point addition-based aggregation, the storage unit's masked bid B i = (b i + k i )Q, where b i is the bid. In case of homomorphic encryption-based aggregation, the storage unit's masked bid is the encryption of the bid using the public key of the homomorphic encryption scheme, i.e.,
where ξ i is a random number. In addition, each storage unit computes the pairing-based message authentication code
D. Aggregated Bid Submission
All the Power_Rep packets of the storage units should be aggregated and the gateway should send an aggregated Power_Rep packet to utility. In case of a single-hop AMI network, after the gateway receives all the Power_Rep packets, it aggregates the signatures, masked bids, and message authentication codes to produce an aggregated signature (σ ), an aggregated masked bid (B) and Mac(B).
The bids are aggregated for the following reasons: 1) preserving the privacy of the storage units' bids and 2) reducing the required bandwidth to send the data to the utility by reducing the packet size. Moreover, the utility company does not need the individual storage units' power injection data, but it needs the total power that can be injected from the community in each time slot. Instead of sending one message for each bid, all the bids of different time slots can be collected in one message.
The aggregated signature σ = n i=1 σ i and the aggregated message authentication code (Mac(B)) is calculated by using point multiplication operations over G m , where
and n is the number of storage units in the community.
For the aggregated bid,
All the bids can be aggregated in one message. Each bid has fixed number of time slots and the power injection in each slot is represented by a constant number of bits. The number of bits assigned to each time slot depends on the maximum amount of power that can be injected by a storage unit and the number of energy storage units in a community. The increase of the number of storage units necessitates increasing the number of bits to avoid experiencing an arithmetic overflow when summing the bids. To elaborate, if we assign h bits for each time slot, the same time slot in all the bids can be added without problems when the total is 2 h − 1. If the summations of the bids in any time slot exceeds 2 h − 1, a carry is generated and added to the power injection amount in the next time slot, which causes a mistake in the total amount of power that can be injected by the community. In this case, either the number of bits in each time slot should be increased or the bids can be aggregated in more than one massage that are free of overflow.
The aggregated message authentication code is the same in the two aggregation schemes and as will be explained later, it is used to enable the utility company to ensure that the bids are sent from the intended storage units and they have not been modified in transit without accessing the individual bids to preserve privacy.
In case of a multihop AMI network, the aggregation process of the signatures, message authentication codes, and masked bids are done by the SMs as the Power_Rep packets are relayed. As shown in Fig. 3 , after each SM receives Power_Rep packets from the downstream SMs, it aggregates them with its data as well and sends the aggregated packet to the upstream SM. For instance, SM 1 and SM 2 send the Power_Rep packets to the upstream SM (SM 3 ). SM 3 aggregates its signature to the signatures of SM 1 and SM 2 to produce aggregated signature σ 1,3 = σ 1 + σ 2 + σ 3 . Similarly, SM 3 aggregates its message authentication code with those of SM 1 and SM 2 to produce
In case of point addition aggregation, SM 3 aggregates its masked bid to the masked bids of SM 1 and SM 2 to produce B 1,3 = B 1 + B 2 + B 3 . B 1,3 is an aggregated masked bid that has the sum of the bids of the three SMs.
In case of homomorphic encryption-based aggregation, SM 3 aggregates its masked bid to the masked bids of SM 1 and SM 2 as follows:
In conclusion, the packet sent by an SM has all the bids of the down stream SMs.
After receiving the bids of all the storage units in the community, the gateway sends a Power_Rep packet to the utility. As shown in Fig. 2 , the packet has the identities of the storage units and the list of r i Q, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and n is the number of storage units. It also has the aggregated signature σ , the aggregated masked bids (B), and Mac(B).
E. Aggregated Bid Decryption and Verification
After receiving the community power reply packet, the utility first verifies the aggregated signature σ to ensure the packets' authenticity and integrity. Sending an aggregated signature can reduce the verification time by using a batch verification technique [9] instead of verifying the individual signatures. Batch verification requires n + 1 pairing operations while individual signature verifications require 2n pairing operations, where n is the number of signatures. The aggregated signature can be verified by checking whether e(σ, Q)
The utility uses the storage units' r i Qs to calculate a shared key with each unit as follows: h 2 (ê (PK i , sk u r u r i Q) ). The proof that this key is similar to the one computed by the storage unit (k i = h 2 (ê(PK u , sk i r i r u Q))) is as follows:
In case of homomorphic encryption-based aggregation, the utility uses the private key (λ) to decrypt the aggregated bids ciphertext (B) by computing
In case of point addition-based aggregation, the utility company uses these keys to obtain the aggregated bid from the masked bid. The total power that can be injected from the community in each time slot can be calculated as follows: b i Q will need increasing computational and storage overhead as the value of aggregated bids increase, but as will be explained in Section V point addition-based scheme requires less overhead than the homomorphic encryption-based scheme.
As concluded in [8] , point addition-based aggregation is more attractive in case of small bid packet size (i.e., small number of energy units in the community), but the homomorphic encryption scheme is more attractive in case of large communities.
In order to verify that the bids are sent from the intended storage units and they have not been modified in transition, the utility company verifies whether
The proof of this is as follows:
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Our scheme uses two well-known mathematical difficulties to achieve security and privacy, called discrete logarithm and computational Diffie-Hellman problems [10] . In discrete logarithm problem, if Q and sk i Q are two points ∈ G a , it is infeasible to compute x such that sk i Q = xQ if x is large.
However, if x is a small number, it can be computed and this has been used in point addition aggregation technique. In computational Diffie-Hellman problem, given Q, r i Q, and r u Q, it is infeasible to compute r i r u Q. In this section, we discuss how our scheme can achieve privacy and security.
A. Analysis of Privacy
Pseudonyms and anonymous authentication have been used to preserve privacy in different applications such as vehicular ad hoc networks [11] . However, using them to hide the identity of storage units, so that the utility can know the individual bids without identifying the storage units, cannot mitigate the privacy threats in our application. For instance, if several units inject low amount of power (or do not inject power) over a period of time in spite of the high purchase prices, the utility can anticipate that the storage units do not have excess power and thus the power demand in the community will increase. This anticipation can be used to manipulate power purchase prices to achieve financial gains. Instead, we use data aggregation technique because it can hide the storage units' individual bids.
In point addition-based aggregation, each storage unit masks its bid with a one-time secret key to preserve the privacy of the bids, where given (b i + k i )Q and Q, it is infeasible to calculate the bid b i without knowing k i . In homomorphic encryptionbased aggregation, bids are encrypted by the public key and it is infeasible to decrypt the ciphertext without knowing the private key. The utility cannot know the individual storage units' bids because the gateway sends an encrypted aggregated bid to the utility and it is infeasible to decompose it to the individual bids. Eavesdroppers, the gateway, and the relay meters cannot figure out the storage units' bids or even the total amount of power injected from the community because they do not know the secret keys.
The use of one-time key (k i ) in point addition aggregation and a one-time random number (ξ i ) in homomorphic encryption-based aggregation can boost the privacy preservation because when the storage units send the same bids in different occasions, the masked bids look completely different and the attacker cannot know whether the bids are similar, less, or even greater.
Moreover, if the same key is reused in point additionbased aggregation, the attacker can calculate the difference between the bids. That means if one bid is exposed, all the bids that use the same key can also be exposed as well. Specifically, given the two bids sent at two different times
Using this value, the attacker can calculate b 1 − b 1 . Similarly, if the same random number ξ i is reused in homomorphic encryption aggregation, the attacker can calculate the difference between the bids as follows:
Attackers cannot know whether a storage unit will inject power or not because the units that do not inject power send packets with zero bid. They do not even know the number of storage units that will inject power. Hiding this information is important to protect the fairness of the energy market.
If a PHEV is not parked, the SM that measures the power injection sends zero bids so that no one can know whether the PHEV is at home or not. The attackers also can not learn the scheduled slots for power injection from a PHEV, and thus they cannot learn the location of the PHEV during these times. In this sense, our scheme does not only aim to protect the privacy of home occupants but also location privacy.
B. Analysis of Security
In additional to countering privacy threats, our scheme can also thwart several security threats. All packets in our scheme are signed to ensure the authenticity and integrity. Any modification to a packet content, such as price list, fails the signature verification. Signatures can also protect against impersonation attacks and the attacks launched by external attackers such as denial of service attacks (e.g., by sending false packets). The attackers cannot impersonate the utility, gateway, or the storage units because the computation of a valid signature needs a private key. Computing the private key sk i from the public key sk i Q is infeasible. Also, computing the private key sk i from a signature, e.g., σ i = sk i h 1 (id i , id u , id a , TS, r i Q), is infeasible. Moreover, if a malicious storage unit tries to use its credentials to send packets in a different community, the gateway can thwart the attack because the attacker should sign the packets and each gateway knows the identities and certificates of the storage units in its community.
We developed a bilinear pairing-based message authentication code to enable the utility to ensure the integrity of the aggregated bid without accessing the individual bids to preserve privacy. The verification of Mac(B) fails if the bids are manipulated or are not sent from the intended storage units.
In packet replay attacks, attackers record valid packets and replay them in a different community or time to pretend as they are fresh. In our scheme, time stamps are used to protect against this attack and stale packets can be identified and dropped. Also, since each key is used for only one time, the verification of the Mac(B) fails if the attacker replays packets that use old keys, i.e., Mac(B) does not only enable the utility to verify the bids' integrity and authenticity but also freshness.
In our scheme, we have used a key management procedure to enable the utility to share keys with the storage units. The attackers cannot compute the keys because this requires the secret number r i . r i is selected by each storage unit and retrieving r i from r i Q, that is sent in clear, is infeasible. Even if the gateway and some storage units collude, they cannot reveal the shared key between a victim storage unit and utility. The key computation is not controlled by one side, but the storage unit and the utility contribute to the key by random numbers. This usually produces more robust keys because the random numbers used in the key computation are generated by two parties.
In man-in-the-middle attacks, the attacker that resides between a storage unit and the utility tries to establish two keys, one key is shared with the utility and the other key is shared with the storage unit, to fool them to believe that they communicate directly. If the attack is successful, the attackers can not only decrypt the storage units' bids and know their bids but also fabricate bids. This is because the bids are not signed in our scheme to preserve privacy. By signing the bids, the utility should access them to be able to verify them which conflicts with privacy. The key agreement procedure is resilient to this attack because r i Q and r u Q are signed by the utility and the storage units.
In Section III, we assumed that each key is used for only one bid. It is a very desirable practice to periodically refresh the shared secret keys. This can protect against cryptanalysis and lessen the amount of information the attacker can obtain if a key is exposed. The key management procedure can achieve both forward and backward secrecy, where the attacker cannot derive the previously used keys nor the future keys if the current key is exposed. This is because the keys are not derived from one key, but each time the utility requests power injection, a new key is computed using one-time random numbers (r i and r u ). Because of this feature, if an attacker could figure out one key (although it is hard), this does not help him to know the old or new bids. We call this property forward/backward privacy preservation.
Finally, in order to reduce the overhead of key calculations, our scheme can be modified to use keys for a predefined period of time. When a key expires, a new key can be shared by sending r i Q and r u Q as explained in our scheme. In this case, a hash chain technique can be used to compute a bid key set {π (1) i , π (2) i , . . . , π ( j) i } by iteratively hashing the main key π
is used for the first bid, π (2) i is used for the second bid, and so on. This enhancement can achieve backward secrecy property but it cannot achieve forward secrecy. If a key is exposed, it is infeasible to calculable the future keys but it is possible to calculate the previously used keys. This is because hash functions are unidirectional, i.e., given x, it is easy to calculate h 2 (x), but given h 2 (x), it is infeasible to compute x. That means if a key is compromised, attackers cannot know future bids but they can know old bids in the bid key set.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. First, we analyze the communication and computation overhead of the packets created and then we assess the network performance through ns-3 simulations.
A. Communication and Computation Overhead 1) Communication Overhead:
The communication overhead is measured by the size of data (in bytes) that should be transmitted by each entity. We assign two bytes for each identity, four bits for each price (p i ), five bytes for TS, 224 bits for q, and 56 bytes for each group point. Since r i Q, signatures, B i , B, Mac(B i ), and Mac(B) are group points, their size is 56 bytes. The size of the homomorphic encryption's ciphertext in Z * f 2 equals to double f . If we choose f to be 2048 bits, then the ciphertext size will be 512 bytes. Note that the security strength of 224-bit key in ECC is equivalent to that of 2048-bit key in RSA cryptosystem [12] .
Using these numbers, the size of the Power_Req packet sent from the utility is 121 + 0.5t bytes, where t is the number of time slots. The size of the Power_Rep packet sent from the storage units and SMs is 235 bytes in case of point addition aggregation and 691 bytes in case of homomorphic encryption aggregation. The size of the Power_Rep packet sent from the gateway is 177 + 58n bytes in case of point addition aggregation and 633 + 58n bytes in case of homomorphic encryption aggregation, where n is the number of storage units in the community.
Instead of sending n signatures with a total of 56n bytes, the aggregated signature needs only 56 bytes for any number of storage units. Similarly, the sizes of B and Mac(B) are the same for any number of storage units. The size of b i that can prevent a carry problem is t × log 2 (16 × n), assuming 4 bits are assigned for the amount of power injection in each slot and n is the number of storage units.
2) Computation Overhead: The computation overhead is the required time to perform an operation in milliseconds (ms). We will focus on measuring the time required for performing the cryptographic operations imposed by our schemes. Note that our experiments were conducted on a computing machine with 2.9 GHz processor and 2 GB Ram with PbC and MIRACL libraries [13] , [14] . The measurements indicate that a pairing, r i Q, point addition, point multiplication, and hashing operations require 7.15 ms, 1.68 ms, 0.63 ms, 0.71 ms, 0.011 ms/Byte, respectively.
Using MIRACL cryptographic library [13] , the homomorphic encryption/decryption operations take 2.4 ms and the one aggregation process takes 0.65 ms. Our scheme uses batch signature verification to reduce the computation overhead. Verifying n individual signatures needs 2n bilinear pairing operations, but the batch verification needs only n + 1 pairing operations.
Using these measurements and the packets indicated in Fig. 2 , we can compute the total computation overhead of our scheme as follows: in order to compose the Power_Req packet, the utility company should compute σ u and r u Q, that takes around 3.5 ms. The gateway, SMs, and the storage units need to verify the signature. This needs two pairing operations and one hashing operation, which take 14.49 ms. Each storage unit composes a Power_Rep packet and sends it to the SM. To compose the packet, the storage unit needs to compute k i , r i Q, σ i , B i , and Mac(B i ). This takes 24.95 in case of point addition aggregation but takes 25.67 in case of homomorphic encryption aggregation. In case of singlehop AMI network, each SM needs to verify the Power_Rep packet and sends it to the gateway. The verification time takes 14.49 ms. In case of multihop AMI network, each SM may need to verify j + 1 Power_Rep packets and aggregate them, where j is the number of downstream SMs. This takes 14.49( j+1)+1.97j = 14.49+16.46j ms in case of point addition aggregation and 14.49( j + 1) + 1.99j = 14.49 + 16.48j ms in case of homomorphic encryption aggregation.
When the gateway receives j Power_Rep packets, it needs to aggregate the signatures, bids, and message authentication codes, and verify the signatures. Signature verifications needs j + 1 pairing operations, signature aggregation needs j − 1 point addition operations, and the message authentication code aggregation needs j − 1 point multiplications. The gateway should also do j − 1 bid aggregations. In case of point addition aggregation, the gateway needs 9.12j + 5.18 to compose an aggregated Power_Rep packet and in case of homomorphic aggregation, the gateway needs 9.14j + 5.16 to compose the packet. In case of single-hop AMI, j is the number of storage units in the community but in case of multihop AMI, j is the number of downstream SMs.
After receiving the aggregated Power_Rep packet, the utility should verify the aggregated signature, extract the aggregated bid, calculate the keys shared with the storage units, and verify the message authentication code. The signature verifications needs n + 1 pairing operations, and the keys calculations need n pairing operations and n multiplications (sk u r u r i Q). Two exponentiation operations are needed to verify the message authentication code. In case of homomorphic encryption-based aggregation, the aggregated bid can be extracted by one exponentiation operation. In case of point addition aggregation, using It can be concluded that the point addition-based aggregation scheme has less overhead than the homomorphic encryption scheme in terms of communication and computation. However, when the number of storage units in a community increases, the aggregated bid ( n i=1 b i ) will also increase, and thus extracting it from n i=1 b i Q in point addition-based aggregation technique will consume more resources. In this case, homomorphic encryption-based aggregation would be a more attractive choice.
B. Network Performance Evaluation With NS-3 1) Experiment Setup:
The discrete-event network simulator ns-3 version 3.22 that has IEEE 802.11s and LTE modules is used for performance evaluation of our approach. Each consumer in a community is assumed to have an IEEE 802.11s wireless-based SM. A gateway with dual interfaces, IEEE 802.11s interface and LTE interface, is used to support bidirectional traffic flow between network tiers. The distance between a gateway and a base station (i.e., eNB) is assumed to be 3000 m. We use a controlled N by N grid topology in our simulation, N ∈ {36, 49, 64, 81, 100}. One node in the grid is selected as the gateway. The remaining nodes act as the SMs. The distance between nodes is 100 m. The transmission range is assumed to be 120 m to minimize the interference between SMs so that each SM has utmost four directly connected neighbors in the diagonal and vertical directions. The simulation time was 1000 s. We assume that the members of a community will be in the same subnetwork and thus we use the limited broadcast approach [15] for distributing the power bid request to the members of a community.
For IEEE 802.11s mesh network, the gateway acts as the mesh portal point and the root node for tree-based routing of the default routing protocol of IEEE 802.11s. As the root node, the gateway periodically broadcasts proactive path request to create and maintain a logical spanning tree rooted at the gateway. In this way, a path to each SM is always available through the gateway and each SM can reach it in multihop fashion through other SMs. For LTE network, this gateway acts as a UE and can communicate with utility company through a base station (i.e., eNB) and an EPC network which serves as the LTE gateway to external network (i.e., Internet).
Meter reading is sent periodically (i.e., 60 s) and assumed to have a higher priority than the power bids. For this purpose, we assigned the meter reading to the video access category in the IEEE 802.11s mesh network and a dedicated bearer in the LTE network while the power-bid is assigned to the best effort access category in the IEEE 802.11s mesh network and the default bearer in the LTE network.
TCP protocol is employed to ensure the reliable data transfer. For meter reading, the TCP end to end connection is from SM to utility company while for power bid, there are two TCP connections, from utility company to the gateway and from the gateway to SMs as shown in Fig. 4 .
2) Performance Metrics and Baselines: We used the following metrics for performance assessment.
1) The average end-to-end (ETE) delay of all packets at the application layer. This metric indicates the ETE delay of each meter reading sent from SMs and successfully received by utility company. 2) Packet delivery ratio (PDR) which indicates the ratio of the total number of meter reading sent by SMs and successfully received by utility company. 3) Power bid collection time which indicates the total collection time from all successful power bids divided by the number of successful power bids during the simulation time. The collection time is measured as the completion time (i.e., the receiving time + the verification time) of aggregated power bid reply at the utility company minus the sending time of the power bid request. Let CT be the average collection time, m be the number of successful power bids, Tx i be the ith time utility company needs to send a power bid request (excluding the bid request composition time), Rx i be the completion time of aggregated power bid reply at the gateway in response to the ith power bid request, where i = {1, 2, . . . , m}. The average collection time is as follows:
In the experiments, we compare three approaches: 1) baseline approach where only meter reading is present in the network; 2) our scheme with homomorphic encryption-based aggregation; and 3) our scheme with point addition-based aggregation.
3) Performance Results:
We first compared the average collection time of power bid operations for point addition and homomorphic approaches as shown in Fig. 5 . We observed that the collection time of the homomorphic is much higher than the point addition approach. In addition to the composition time and the verification time, the transmission time contributes to the higher delay of the homomorphic approach. The transmission time for homomorphic approach is longer for bid reply from SMs to the gateway since the bid reply is fragmented. This is because the bid reply data size is higher than the TCP maximum segment size (MSS). As defined in [16] , the default MSS is 536 bytes and a packet that is longer than this MSS will be fragmented. In turn, these fragmented bid replies increase the network traffic and possibly collision in the mesh network that may lead to packet retransmission. Thus, since the gateway must wait for the bid replies from all SMs in the community to arrive before it can perform bid aggregation and send an aggregated bid reply to utility company, the collection time is higher than the point addition approach. In both approaches, depending on the number of community members, the aggregated bid reply may be fragmented and thus this increases the LTE network traffic as well.
In the second set of experiments, we conducted simulations with a mixture of SM data and power bid traffic. The presence of the power bid traffic makes almost a negligible impact on the meter reading traffic, in particular for small networks (i.e., fewer than 100 nodes). As the node count increases, even though meter reading has higher priority, the presence of the power bid traffic causes an increase on the delay of the meter readings as depicted in Fig. 6 . We would like to note that we do not show the PDRs of both traffic since the PDRs are 100%.
VI. RELATED WORK
Since the simultaneous charging of a large number of PHEVs degrades the performance of the power grid, several schemes have been proposed to coordinate power charging. Gan et al. [17] propose a decentralized algorithm to optimally schedule PHEVs charging. Wu et al. [18] develop a model to understand the interactions between the PHEV owner and the gateway where PHEVs provide the frequency regulation service to the grid. In [19] , we have proposed a privacypreserving power charging coordination scheme. The storage units send anonymous charging requests to the utility. Unlike our approach in this paper, the requests should not be aggregated because the utility should know the individual requests to coordinate changing.
In AMI network, the SMs should periodically send finegrained power consumption data to the utility. Since this data can reveal private information about the users' activities, several schemes have been proposed to preserve privacy such as [20] and [21] . In [20] , we developed a meter data obfuscation approach to preserve consumer privacy that has the ability to perform distribution state estimation. Using obfuscation values provided via this approach, the meter readings are obfuscated to protect consumer privacy from eavesdroppers and the utility companies while preserving the utility companies' ability to use the data for state estimation. In [21] , we have proposed a new approach that is based on adding noise to the reading data so no one can obtain the meters' individual data but the utility can know the total readings of the meters.
Different than these studies, this paper focuses on home batteries power injection problem and its privacy side-effects.
On the communication side, there are studies which employ LTE [22] and a hybrid of LTE/WiFi [23] but none of them considered supporting the power injection communications. Cheng et al. [24] focus on applying LTE technology to build a high-reliable and low-latency distribution automation network for the smart grid. Cao et al. [25] propose an electric power wireless communication network. The system is designed based on LTE technology, and rebuilds its physical layer according to the need of the power system. Security and privacy-preserving schemes have been investigated for different networks and applications [8] , [26] - [32] . However, these scheme cannot resolve the issues we address in this paper because they are designed for different network models, problems, and requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced and motivated the problem of privacy exposure of storage unit owners during the power injections operations to the utility. To tackle this problem, we presented a novel secure and privacy-preserving power injection querying scheme over AMI and LTE cellular networks. The idea is based on using aggregation techniques to hide the private information of storage units' owners. Two aggregation techniques based on point addition and homomorphic encryption have been used. We also developed a bilinear pairing-based technique to enable the utility company to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the aggregated bid without accessing the individual bids. Our scheme can resist the possible attacks and preserve storage owners' privacy with minimal communication overhead which is in terms of packet size and delay increase.
